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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5818  
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1746  
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 3007  
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RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0440

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000825

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PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS, RABAT FOR LEGAT,  
STATE FOR AF/C AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2012

TAGS: [CASC](#) [PTER](#) [CD](#) [LY](#)

SUBJECT: CHAD AMCIT CASE: REPORTED MDJT REQUEST

REF: NDJAMENA 812

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)  
)

¶1. (SBU) CDA and other Emboffs met with Mr. Hadir Adjji, President of the Associations Friends of the Tibesti and two of his colleagues on October 19 to pass on the message that the case of seized American Cash Steven Godbold was being followed with a great deal of interest and concern in Washington, and that the Embassy had asked for Government of Chad assistance. CDA explained to the group that the United States would not negotiate with the MDJT, but that we hoped that the Tubu community would do everything possible to seek Godbold's release, given the importance the United States attached to the safety of a U.S. citizen, and bearing in mind the implications that this had for future U.S. assistance to the region. The Tubu leaders said that Godbold was considered a member of their community; that it was highly unlikely that any harm would come to him. They strongly warned against using any kind of force, stating that the town of Zoumri had been an MDJT stronghold for years.

¶2. (C) Subsequently, Mr. Adjji requested to see CDA on October 23. Mr. Adjji (please protect) said that he had traveled to Maroua (Nigeria) over the weekend where he had spoken three times over the phone with MDJT leader Choa Dazi (who he said was in Libya.)

¶3. (C) Mr. Adjji informed CDA that Dazi told him that Godbold had been seized in order to call attention to the MDJT movement, and so that the Government of Chad would take the movement seriously. Dazi told Adjji that he wanted the Americans to support the MDJT movement, and to advocate for it with the Government of Chad. Mr. Adjji informed the CDA that he had told Dazi that Godbold should be released without any preconditions. He told CDA that he had assured Adjji that after Godbold's release that the Americans would be willing to support efforts -- much as the EU, the UN or France was doing -- for national reconciliation.

¶4. (C) CDA informed Mr. Adjji of the travel to Bardai of a Red Cross representative who would be available to meet discretely with MDJT representatives. Mr. Adjji said that he would follow up on this information with his colleagues and with the Red Cross representative in N'Djamena (who he knows well). Mr. Adjji felt that Dazi might be willing to release Godbold to the Red Cross.

¶5. (C) CDA agreed with Mr. Adjji that Mr. Godbold should be released without any preconditions. Concerning Mr. Adjji's comments to Dazi on what the USG might or might not be

willing to do should Godbold be released, she explained that the United States Government had stated publicly that it did not support any efforts to seize power in Chad by arms and we called on all parties to find a peaceful solution. However, the seizure of Mr. Godbold was a criminal act; Mr. Godbold had nothing to do with the internal politics of Chad and the United States would not be drawn into these by means of hostage-taking.

COMMENT:

16. (C) Despite Dazi's message through Mr. Adj, it is not clear whether Dazi is opportunistically seeking to score points for his splinter (and very marginalized) wing of the MDJT or whether he is acting under instructions from (or to curry favor with) Libya.

17. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.  
TAMLYN